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Introduction
The term authenticity is most often invoked in tourism studies to describe the 
process whereby tourists evaluate the ‘realness’ or otherwise of a tourist destina-
tion. Studies investigating tourist motivations indicate a strong desire for travel 
experiences and destinations that are genuine and/or unique both physically 
and culturally (MacCannell, 1973). When some tourists plan their travels, they 
frequently ask themselves: to what degree is the destination real, and to what 
degree has it been preserved from the despoiling inﬂ uences of global capitalism?
Authenticity, and its opposite inauthenticity, is similarly invoked by existen-
tial philosophers to describe modes of human existence. Authenticity is charac-
terized by an honest encounter with the fundamental conditions of existence, 
namely freedom, responsibility, choice, anxiety, alienation and death (to name 
just a few). In contrast, inauthenticity is a mode of existence characterized by 
the building of psychological defences in order to avoid the conditions of exis-
tence. This mode of existence leads to isolation from world, one another and 
oneself through self-deception (MacCannell, 1973).
Scholars in the ﬁ eld of leisure and tourism studies have argued for some 
time now that leisure and tourism experiences have the potential for self-
enhancement, and that opportunities and potential for such augmentation 
makes leisure and tourism signiﬁ cant in many people’s lives (MacCannell, 1973). 
As existential psychologists, it is clear to us that much of this self-enhancement 
is the result of encountering the conditions of existence with an attitude of open-
ness. However, it is surprising to us that relatively few authors in the leisure ﬁ eld 
have employed existential philosophy as a conceptual lens through which to 
interpret leisure experiences. One of the few exceptions is  Kelly’s (1982; see 
also Kelly, 1981) Leisure Identities and Interactions, which interprets leisure 
experiences through the existential concept of ‘becoming’.
106 Chapter 7
The use of existential concepts for interpretive purposes has tended 
to  ﬁ gure more prominently in the tourism literature. For example, Wang 
(1999) argues that ‘object’ (destination)-related conceptualizations of authentic-
ity in tourism studies are narrow and lack interpretative power, while Steiner 
and Reisinger (2006) explore existential themes with an emphasis on authen-
ticity, stating that its application to tourism studies requires a more robust 
 phenomenological framework such as the one developed by Heidegger 
(1927/1962).
In contributing to this modest yet growing body of knowledge, this chapter 
begins with a brief sketch of authenticity in tourism studies and its conceptual-
ization in the existential literature. This is then followed by a discussion on how 
authenticity might usefully be applied to interpret the burgeoning ﬁ eld of volun-
teer tourism.
Authenticity in Tourism Studies
Authenticity when applied to tourism is often equated with an ideal bygone 
era. We see this in the fetishized display of museum objects, which engen-
ders a culturally imbued attitude towards the ‘foreign’ and the ‘exotic’. This 
promotes a genre error dating back to when ‘primitive peoples’ entered 
exhibits in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century (Kirshenblatt- 
Gimblett, 1998). Kirshenblatt-Gimblett claims that museum exhibitions of 
the quotidian have transformed the ways in which ordinary life might be 
viewed, so that ordinary things become out of the ordinary when placed in 
museum settings. The museum experience becomes a culturally conditioned 
model for experiencing life outside one’s own culture when travelling (Kirsh-
enblatt-Gimblett, 1998: 51).
The authentic tourism experience is one in which the tourist gets in touch 
with both a real world and their real selves (Handler & Saxton, 1988: 243). 
Nevertheless, it would be an error to propose that the emotional experience of 
‘the real’ entails an epistemological experience of a real situation: the show put 
on in the tourist destination may be bogus just as a museum object may be a 
fake (MacCannell, 1973). Wang (1999: 358) contends that existential authen-
ticity in tourism acts as a healthy antidote to the experience of alienation, or 
the loss of the ‘true’ self in our work and societal roles. Subjectively, Wang’s 
(1999) intra-personal authenticity refers to ephemeral bodily feelings of plea-
sure and spontaneity, but also to aimed-for peak experiences not encountered 
in everyday life (McDonald et al., 2009). Interpersonal experiences for Wang 
(2000: 68) involve the construction of ‘communitas’ in and among tourists and 
their hosts.
Daniel (1996) uses dance performance to magnify existential authenticity 
in the sphere of tourism. He believes dance performances, such as the rumba 
in Cuba, are further authenticated by the tourist’s participation in the event 
rather than just being a spectator of it. Similarly, any imposed exclusion from 
the dance would, according to Radcliff-Brown (1964), produce a feeling of 
alienation as being ‘put on the shelf’ and perpetuate the long-established tourist 
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role of detached observer. From the performing dancers, tourists ‘access the 
magical world of liminality which offers spiritual and aesthetic nourishment’ 
(Daniel, 1996: 789). This liminal world, Daniel (1996) argues, affords relief 
from day-to-day tensions and authorizes immoderation approaching ‘near-
ecstatic experiences’ (p. 789). Similarly, Wang (2000) maintains that engaging 
in tourism implies an easier, freer, spontaneous, less functional and more 
romantic lifestyle, which enables people to transcend their daily lives. The more 
adventurous postmodern tourist does not bother themselves with the authentic-
ity of toured objects. Rather they are in search of their authentic selves with the 
aid of such objects and locations.
Olsen (2002) maintains MacCannell’s (1973) quest for authenticity in tour-
ism is doomed to failure because of the tourist’s role as an interloper. Since 
social relations are bought and traded along with goods, the tourist buys what 
she/he sees when the product is promoted. ‘Faking up’ becomes a producer-
driven activity where falsiﬁ cation increases the ‘available store’ in a commodity. 
If the producer is concerned with the well-being of the product only to the 
extent that it generates revenue, its authenticity will be of minor importance. 
Commercialism and commodiﬁ cation thereby reinforce this function by its own 
polluting presence that simultaneously connotes inauthenticity (Wang, 1999: 
353; Olsen, 2002: 166; Kim & Jamal, 2007: 184). Olsen (2002: 166) insists 
the tourist role is antithetical towards intimacy and closeness. By entering the 
tourist role – which can be acquired by simply being a well-heeled unknown 
arrival – one is present to, but not a part of, the current activity (Radcliffe-
Brown, 1964). What is at issue here is not how tourists judge what they see in 
others (for they are free to do this in any way they choose), but that they do so 
from the vantage point of an unequal set of power relations, particularly in the 
case of tourists from wealthy developed countries touring poorer developing 
countries.
Yet, despite what Olsen (2002) says, and even among tourists themselves, 
there is often a persistent resistance to being cast in the role of a tourist. The 
expression ‘typical tourist’ is a pejorative term and Wang (2000) has caught 
this mood in his descriptions of tourists attempting to leap out of their role in 
the hope of seeking more authentic experiences and identities.
The authenticity of objects in the tourist destination presumes an original, 
pure state that extends to cultures. Prior to the advent of tourism, the local 
culture had its own authority structure that used power for its own ends 
( Wearing & McDonald, 2002). Previously, a culture could choose and maintain 
its own values, but now it must accede to global capitalism, which alters infra-
structure, employment and the environment through economic force (Ritzer, 
2003).
Olsen asks (2002: 171–172): how does one get rid of the tourist role but 
keep the tourist? The theory of ritual as performance makes agency credit-
able to the actors; when tourists are brought into the role of participation in 
the joint work experience (for example, an exorcism) that usually belongs 
only to the host culture, it is shared and the typical distancing role of touristic 
observer is contracted. Other activities, such as assisting in shipbuilding 
(Olsen, 2002) overcome the alienation of detached observer. It is here that 
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we begin to glimpse some of the differences between volunteer tourism and 
mass tourism, where the former seeks to invite a more genuine contact 
through the tourist’s active and mutually beneﬁ cial participation in local com-
munity projects.
Existential Authenticity
Existential philosophy is a diverse set of beliefs and assumptions that is more 
often labelled an ‘attitude’ or an ‘approach’ to life, than a coherent set of 
philosophical principles (Friedman, 1964; Macquarie, 1973; Charlesworth, 
1975; Cooper, 2003). Kaufmann (1975: 11–12) notes:
Existentialism is not a philosophy but a label for several widely different 
revolts against traditional philosophy. Most of the living ‘existentialists’ have 
repudiated this label, and a bewildered outsider might well conclude that the 
only thing they have in common is a marked aversion for each other . . . The 
refusal to belong to any school of thought, the repudiation of the adequacy 
of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially systems, and a marked 
dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superﬁ cial, academic, and 
remote from life – that is the heart of existentialism.
Despite this lack of agreement (or indeed a willingness by certain philosophers 
to accept the existential label), there are a number of identiﬁ able themes that 
characterize the existential concept of authenticity. These include freedom, 
responsibility, anxiety, choice, alienation, death, intersubjectivity, dogma, and 
meaning and purpose (McDonald, 2009). While the number of philosophers 
associated with existentialism is potentially large, our focus in this chapter will 
be on the two most inﬂ uential ﬁ gures of the 20th century – Martin Heidegger 
and Jean-Paul Sartre.
Existentialism explores the meaningfulness of human existence and the 
manner in which human beings attempt to overcome various forms of alien-
ation (isolation and self-estrangement) from world, one another and oneself 
(Friedman, 1964; Cooper, 1999). Existential philosophers dismiss notions of 
an essential or inherent human nature, referring instead to conditions of 
humanness, which are not composed of essences but are instead grounded in 
existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 152; Sartre, 1948/1973: 26). This non-
determinative worldview places each person in a position where they are 
responsible for deﬁ ning self-identity. The idea of a reﬂ exive self – a concept 
that has come to characterize modernity (Giddens, 1991; Beck et al., 1994; 
Bauman, 1996) – is one that is also of great concern and interest to Heidegger 
and Sartre. Where historically self-identity was ﬁ xed by one’s station in life, in 
modernity it is problematized and treated as a project; one that is created 
through choice and the totality of one’s actions (Sartre, 1948/1973: 28). Self-
identity has become a task or vocation; growth (or self-overcoming as some 
existentialist’s term it) is grasped in the conditions of freedom, so that self-
identity is a verb-like happening or event that is deﬁ ned in terms of an ongoing 
life-story (Guignon, 1993: 224–225).
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The concept of ‘authenticity’ lies at the heart of existential concepts of 
 self-identity; it is a mode of being that periodically overcomes the alienating 
elements of the modern world. It is impossible to achieve a state of permanent 
authenticity; instead, it represents an ongoing dialogue between inauthentic 
and authentic modes of existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962; Ciaffa, 1987; 
Flynn, 1999). The conscious awareness of authentic modes of existence arises 
from a reﬂ ection on the contrasting mode of inauthenticity.
Inauthenticity is characterized by psychological defences and barriers 
that seek to protect and immure against the conditions of existence 
(Fromm, 1941/1994; Yalom, 1980). It is most vividly evident when one is 
forced to face the conditions of existence. Confronted with being-towards-
death, the roles we have been involved with may seem superfluous when 
compared with the new need to uncover a meaning based on Heideggerian 
concern. Where inauthenticity is characterized by preoccupation with the 
everydayness of life, authenticity is gained by resoluteness and a sense of 
direction for one’s life as a whole. The encounter between these two 
modes of existence has the potential to spark a dynamic dialogue, popular-
ized by the well known expression ‘angst’, or what some might term ‘exis-
tential anxiety’ (May, 1950/1996). Change and growth are stimulated by 
anxiety and an attitude of openness, manifested by the renewal and 
 reaffirmation of one’s past, while simultaneously projecting oneself and 
one’s possibilities into the future. The temporal condition of existence 
means that death is life’s ultimate destination, stimulating a desire to  create 
meaning and purpose in one’s life (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 311; Farber, 
1990).
Inauthenticity – sometimes described as bad faith – denotes the activity of 
denying one’s essential freedom. It is related to self-deception where an indi-
vidual may be conscious or unconscious of her/his inauthenticity. For Hei-
degger, anxiety is the product of recognizing that one does not provide for the 
basis of oneself. A person living an inauthentic life is damaging their possibili-
ties of realising truly chosen goals; she/he knows they are free but does not 
acknowledge it. Although the facts of a situation limit freedom to act, they do 
not limit freedom to think and select an attitude. Inauthenticity is therefore an 
act of submission, a resignation concerning reaction to overwhelming forces, 
but nevertheless a decision, curiously, itself made possible by freedom. Feelings 
of guilt arise when one rejects this call to one’s freedom, and awareness of 
one’s ultimate destination, for failing to live up to one’s possibilities (Heidegger, 
1927/1962: 224: 341–343).
Immersion in the world (being-in-the-world) makes it impossible to avoid 
inauthenticity and the modern conditions of alienation; however, it is one’s 
approach to the alienating elements of modernity that enables one to 
 occasionally ‘rise above it’. The authentic self, it is suggested, is located 
 somewhere between the individual and their world; it is a balance between 
being-in-the-world and an ongoing reﬂ ection on one’s consciousness as a 
free being (Guignon, 2004a). Authenticity is not a departure from social life 
but a process of individuation and relatedness that allows one to express 
 oneself freely in the social milieu. It is an engagement with the public world, 
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not an avoidance of it. The task is to remain ‘in-the-world’ while willing 
a life higher than the average ‘everydayness’. Guignon (1993: 228–230) 
writes:
It is important to keep in mind that authenticity has nothing to do with such 
romantic ideals as getting in touch with a deeper inner self or rising above 
the herd . . . Indeed, since our own life stories are inseparable from the wider 
text of the shared we-world, authenticity can be nothing other than a fuller 
and richer form of participation in the public context . . . Achieving the 
narrative continuity of authentic existence is what ﬁ rst makes possible 
personal identity understood as the ‘constancy of the self’ – its ‘steadiness’ 
and ‘steadfastness’ – stretched out across the life span.
Yet remaining ‘in-the-world’ requires the maintenance of a circumspect atti-
tude, for authenticity is characterized by eschewing feelings of potency and 
tranquilization derived from dogmatic ideologies and the conveniences of 
 socio-cultural conformity (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 163–168). Authenticity is a 
mode of becoming whereby the source of one’s own power is located without 
the need to objectify and manipulate the Other in bad faith. Self-identity 
is bound up in the creation of meaning that brings purpose to one’s life. One’s 
life-story is given coherence in a chaotic world that has no pre-ordained 
 meaning or destiny, by following a path or mission that one freely chooses to 
pursue.
This is never an easy prospect in a consumer society with its constantly 
evolving and changing fads and fashions, as well as media saturation. The indi-
vidual is coaxed into a constant search for stimulation, new experiences, events 
and images, and the constant reinvention of self-identity (Smart, 2010). This 
contributes to identity confusion and fragmentation (Kellner, 1992). Steiner 
and Reisinger (2006: 302) wonder, ‘whose self one is when not the real self’. 
Both Heidegger and Sartre contend there is no enduring self like an object – 
so there cannot be any ‘real’ self to aspire to or attain, but this does not 
mean one cannot make false steps during the struggle to achieve one. For 
Sartre (1943/1972, 1948/1973) individual choices deﬁ ne and constitute 
 identity. Actions are not actions of the self; rather the self is a product of 
action.
For humans, identity is always something yet to be achieved. To try and 
escape the endless search for identity by embracing ready-made ‘identities’ is 
to adopt a persona, literally a mask and a role, with set speeches and 
patterns of behaviour. The genuinely free master, on the other hand, will 
experience continual striving and will always be in the process of becoming, 
never being. She is dynamic, ﬂ uid and ever creative, never ceasing to search 
for greater self-knowledge and self-transparency. She will always strive to 
become what she chooses to become, regardless of what others expect, 
demand or invite her to be.
(Sartre, cited in Golomb, 1995: 145)
In the ﬁ nal section below, we discuss authenticity, voluntarist ethics and 
how these relate to modes of authenticity in the volunteer tourism experi-
ence.
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Authenticity, Voluntarist Ethics and Tourism
One of the most powerful criticisms levelled against existential philosophy is 
that its orientation produces an alienated state that constantly verges on solip-
sism. Dostoyevsky’s Raskolnikov, Camus’s Meursault and Sartre’s Roquentin 
make charismatic anti-heroes but fail to make any difference to the world. Nev-
ertheless, the relation of the individual to society occupies Heidegger and Sar-
tre’s thoughts considerably, and it is through their thinking that we are able to 
offer an interpretation of volunteer tourism and the changes to self-identity that 
it potentially precipitates.
Volunteer tourism involves working with local communities, without ﬁ nan-
cial remuneration, on social and environmental projects around the world; it 
‘aims to provide sustainable alternative travel that can assist in community 
development, scientiﬁ c research or ecological restoration’ (Wearing, 2004: 
214). Volunteer tourism differs from other forms of tourism in that it offers 
much greater opportunities to negotiate the fundamental conditions of exis-
tence, and therefore modes of authenticity. In most forms of tourism, the 
tourist is chaperoned and protected in the countries, regions and cities they 
seek to travel through (Olsen, 2002). In contrast, volunteer tourism ideally 
dissolves the barriers that exist between tourists, locals, culture and the envi-
ronment. By its very nature it fosters intimacy and closeness when volunteers 
ﬁ nd themselves working and living alongside their hosts; it affords a degree of 
mutual exchange and interaction that is uncommon in other forms of tourism 
(Zahra &  McIntosh, 2007).
For Heidegger, however, our engagement as social beings is a double-
edged sword. Although it is possible to experience ourselves as inauthentic 
when adopting ‘the they’ as a surrogate legitimacy pandering to convention, it 
is also the participation in ‘the they’ that gives us enabling resources for being 
fully human, as a richer form of participation in the public context. Heidegger’s 
Dasein (being-in-the-world) therefore lives in an ambiguity where one may be 
enlivened or quashed by one’s possibilities (Guignon, 2004b: 226–228). For 
Heidegger’s being-with-others, existence arrives already imbued with others 
and there is neither question of the solipsist’s ‘discovery’ of other people, nor 
can we disentangle ourselves from relationships and attempt to exist ‘on a 
higher plane’. The relationship with others is a priori because being is always a 
being-with, whether it is with others, or with the world itself, so Dasein’s world 
is always a co-world. We may attempt to escape and ignore others through 
indifference and the building of defence mechanisms. However, Heidegger 
(1927/1962: 85–86) insists that we are being-with-others, even when they are 
physically absent, as with sentiments such as nostalgia or resentment. When 
the possibility of authentic or inauthentic relations with others arises through 
being-at-hand, he says both must be conducted through solicitude. One can 
solicit relationships with others as ‘taking over’ where one acts for the other in 
a position of control, or one can solicit relationships through helping others 
solve things in their own way (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 158–159).
The latter approach is a circumspect and respectful solicitude, which allows 
and encourages the Other’s right to self-determination. In seeking to work with 
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and contribute in some constructive way to the aims of a local community, the 
volunteer tourist eschews the alienating activity of ‘gazing’ from afar. This has 
been elaborated by Sartre in his concept of ‘the look’, which disempowers the 
observed by turning them into objects (Sartre, 1943/1972: 276–282). For 
Sartre, the gaze is that which imprisons the observed within an objective judge-
ment they cannot see and from which they cannot escape.
When Heidegger (1927/1962: 158) speaks of interrelationships where 
one does not leap in for the Other, there would be a correspondent diminution 
of unequal power relations and the poor behaviour of the tourist as exempliﬁ ed 
by backpacker tourism (Scheyvens, 2002a: 148). Gone would be the demand 
that tourist and host engage in a largely commodiﬁ ed transaction. Instead, the 
world becomes an intersubjectively constituted totality in which it becomes pos-
sible for the tourist to encounter other entities in reciprocity, whether this is 
other people or the physical environment.
Heidegger believes that when one ‘leaps in’, for another, one removes the 
other’s possibilities by solving the other’s problems for them, and thereby dom-
inating their concerns. People for whom one leaps in are dominated, ‘dis-
authenticated’ and rendered dependent. Arguably, many tour operators do this 
‘leaping in’ when orchestrating services, transport, accommodation and eating 
for their clients. Hosts, in situations like this, may be inauthentic because they 
feel they must pander to tourist and organizer expectations (Steiner & Reis-
inger, 2006: 310).
In The Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre (1960/1981) showed what 
would be necessary to approximate a we-subject. These features involve: a 
commonly perceived external exigency, a renunciation of absolute individual 
freedom, reciprocity, and a pledge amongst others. In the case where some 
tourists and hosts maintain contact with each other after the event (Kim & 
Jamal, 2007: 192), we can see the germinations of such a united group, but 
these reunions do not have the characteristics of the fused group (no pledge); 
they are, at best, an emerging en fusion where temporality and physical sepa-
ration (after the tourist goes home) combine to throw the tourist back into the 
disconnected serialized state. This is an unavoidable and sudden isolation from 
new-found friends, and a physical and cultural environment that is different 
from home. As difﬁ cult as this separation is for tourist and host, it has the 
potential to provide both parties with a template for negotiating future and 
inevitable experiences of loss and bereavement.
In the tourism literature (e.g. Olsen, 2002: 167), there is a frequent 
eschewal of the role of the tourist. This sense of discomfort, closely aligned to 
inauthenticity, and dissatisfaction with ‘just being a visitor’, suggests pressure is 
being exerted on the commonplace role of tourists to transform themselves 
into a more responsible ensemble. Were tourism to become not so much a 
temporary escape into divertissement, where authentic experience is optional, 
but more a voluntary decision, complete with the renunciation of unequal 
power relations – there would be a new space for a different kind of relation-
ship conducted at the local level (Olsen, 2002; Scheyvens, 2002b; Gray & 
Campbell, 2007; Kim & Jamal, 2007; McIntosh & Zahra, 2007; Butcher & 
Smith, 2010).
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One representation of the less responsible ensemble is the often self- centred, 
unkempt, immoral, drug-taking backpacker, who may be found treating the host 
community as a fun theme park (Scheyvens, 2002a). In contrast, volunteer tour-
ists in the truest sense desire interaction with hosts and the environment in order 
to contribute something meaningful that has direct local beneﬁ ts (Brown & 
Lehto, 2005; Sin, 2009). As a result, tourist and host share day-to-day lived 
experiences where they often learn something of other cultures and people 
(Montuori & Fahim, 2004). The tension between the values of mass tourism and 
volunteer tourism is expressed very well by Gray and Campbell (2007: 479) 
when they write:
At one end, tourism is commodiﬁ ed; it resembles mass tourism, economic 
values equate to proﬁ ts accrued by non-local companies, local environments 
and people are aesthetically consumed, and tourists neither question these 
values nor seek to demonstrate more ethical values. At the opposite end, 
tourism is decommodiﬁ ed; economic beneﬁ ts are locally retained, tourists 
engage in meaningful experiences with local environments and people, and 
they seek such ‘ethical’ engagement with local culture rather than the 
enhancement of their own ‘cultural capital’.
Nevertheless, the volunteer tourist may lack empathy when they trivialize pov-
erty, or use host locations as training grounds to develop professional and 
career-related skills (Raymond & Hall, 2008b: 533–538). Notably, they have a 
marked preference for exotic locations. ‘Earthwatch has a good handle on 
what sells – proposals involving coral reefs and tropics are likely winners, as are 
furry animals and pretty birds’ (Speer, 1994: 21). These problems may be 
compounded by the volunteer tourists themselves who may not have useful 
skills, not be familiar with the local culture (or wish to understand it in any 
meaningful way), and only stay for a short period – perhaps with the ethics of 
a new kind of ‘noblesse oblige’ (Tomazos & Butler, 2009a: 198). The mutual 
beneﬁ t and reciprocity advocated by McIntosh and Zahra (2007) implies: ‘The 
narrative and traditional interaction between host and tourist is thus potentially 
rewritten as the tourist experience is actively constructed by the host as well as 
the tourist’ (p. 554), especially where communal activities such as singing, 
dancing and storytelling promote reciprocity (Raymond & Hall, 2008b: 540).
The theme of voluntarism (as contrasted with volunteering) has been a 
disposition within existentialist thought for a long time (Olafson, 1970: 35–37). 
Arguably, an existentially motivated and voluntarist ethic has been taken up by 
volunteer tourists who, in the absence of a previous generation’s ‘left wing, 
right wing’ political orientation, see themselves as simply wanting to make the 
world a better place (Butcher & Smith, 2010). Here the ethics of the volunteer 
tourist do not ﬁ nd a frame in any particular ideological creed, avoiding the 
alienation and reiﬁ cation of dogmatic beliefs. Other motivations are more self-
serving and include furnishing one’s CV with laudable accomplishments, and a 
gap-year that promises time off, relaxation and fun. Some 350,000 annual 
placements made by 800 organizations suggest that young people are indiffer-
ent to traditional ideologies that characterize institutionalized spiritual and 
 political outlooks of past generations. Rather, they are reacting to a more fun-
damental ‘life politics’ by seeking to engage in morally justiﬁ able actions that 
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simultaneously contribute to the construction of a life narrative (Giddens, 1991: 
209–231; Butcher & Smith, 2010: 29–30). Underpinning this narrative 
approach to life is a focus on ‘becoming’ via an immersion into an alien culture 
(Montuori & Fahim, 2004).
By choosing to place themselves in alien environment, often far from the 
securities of home, and where the normal touristic comforts and securities do 
not exist, the volunteer tourist is much more likely to be confronted with the 
conditions of existence and the possibility of experiencing modes of authentic-
ity. The initial experience of the volunteer tourist is naturally one of anxiety. It 
is in the experience of anxiety that one is able to recognize alienation in the 
form of idle talk, contentment and tranquillization (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 
232). Sartre (1939/2002: 61) adds:
Emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of 
the ways in which consciousness understands (in Heidegger’s sense of 
Verstehen) its being-in-the-world.
The anxiety that stems from such a forthright being-in-the-world creates the 
conditions for insight and reﬂ ection on the conditions of existence, yet over-
indulgence in reﬂ ection and introspection can act to poison the self and degen-
erate into solipsism (Golomb, 1995: 136–137).
We cannot create our selves by looking inward into our seemingly given 
selves, by indulging in emotions or by imagining. Only by action, by 
 changing the world, can the self be created.
(Golomb, 1995: 140)
The initial volunteer tourist experience of anxiety is gradually transformed as 
they learn to understand and accept an alien way of life, and where action in 
the form of work connects them to people and the physical and cultural envi-
ronment in unique and intimate ways. In most forms of mass tourism, the tour-
ist is unlikely to experience any form of anxiety that may precipitate insight and 
greater understanding of self and world, lest their travels be deemed unaccept-
able. In striking out for authenticity, the volunteer tourist becomes a law unto 
themselves in the absence of everyday norms and cultural sanctions (Sartre, 
1943/1972). At ﬁ rst sight, this is an anxiety provoking experience, which is 
resolved by assuming a responsibility for one’s life greater than previously 
imagined. If there are no pre-ordained values, then choosing a value becomes 
one’s own responsibility – there can be no appeal to a higher authority at a 
later date if things do not turn out well. This is what Sartre (1948/1973) 
referred to when he suggested that human beings are ‘condemned to freedom’. 
The seeming liberation from convention brings with it unpredictable conse-
quences, and an unforgiving measure of accountability. The volunteer tourist is 
placed in a situation where previous values cease to exist and where new values 
need to be examined and tested. For Sartre, this freedom brings a liability 
towards one’s perception of oneself without equivocation. The opportunity to 
vacate, to be somewhere else, provides the opportunity to experiment and 
construct alternative selves. As Montuori and Fahim (2004) note: ‘The encoun-
ter with another culture . . . becomes an opportunity to understand who we 
are, what we value and hold dear, and what we feel strongly about’ (p. 254).
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Conclusion
Volunteer tourists express a desire to move away from forms of travel that 
disempower local communities and turn them into objects (Wearing & 
Grabowski, 2011). However, as previously noted, the volunteer tourist must be 
careful to not leap in for the Other by imposing their own personal aims onto 
the people, communities and environments in which they seek to travel and 
work (e.g. Palacios, 2010). These ideas ﬁ t nicely with existential philosophy 
where the search and creation of a justiﬁ ed self surfaces as paramount. Yet the 
notion of global citizenship (which, in many ways, the volunteer tourist embod-
ies) in a post-traditional world is an idea hard to place within thetic concepts 
contiguous to knowledge and belief, as proposed by religious or political ideol-
ogy, particularly capitalist ideology with its emphasis on capital accumulation 
and commodiﬁ cation. However, it is easily accommodated within an existen-
tialist ontology that prioritizes attitudinal dispositions created in the unavoid-
able conditions of freedom, choice, responsibility and anxiety to which the 
volunteer tourist chooses to expose him- or herself.
It is not difﬁ cult to see where the existential perspective is leading. Volun-
teer tourists in search of existential authenticity are not simply in search of a 
knowledge of the touring location, nor do they seek to pilfer or assimilate a 
sculptural slice of the destination for their shelves at home on returning. Yet 
neither should they be glibly fooling around with playacting. Existential volun-
teer tourists are seeking modiﬁ cations within their own selves, and their own 
sense of being, as a result of experiencing being and difference through related-
ness to alien peoples and environments. The implications for this are that these 
volunteer tourists are breaking down the commodiﬁ ed notion of separateness 
between ‘tourist’ and ‘destination’.
Volunteer tourists are doing this through a mutual concern for locals and 
their environment, a renunciation of absolute individual freedom (denying the 
liberty to get drunk and stoned on the host’s beach and to make a nuisance of 
oneself), reciprocity (mutual caring), and where one can appreciate the notion 
of ‘seeing oneself in the other’ (Sartre, 1960/1981: 634). Furthermore, when 
volunteer tourists have peak experiences, or as Wang (2000) says, become 
‘mystically ecstatic’, there is an aimed for (though probably ﬂ eeting) fusion of 
self within the target culture – and a concomitant depletion of separateness 
between the tourist as guest and the host as provider we suggest that with vol-
unteer tourists this is more likely to occur. Volunteer tourists who interact with 
a sense of commitment, and have, beforehand, sought an informed deference 
towards the norms of the host culture, do not just return home with souvenirs, 
photographs and other artefacts that are evidence of cultural capital: they enjoy 
a modiﬁ cation within their own being through a humanized internationalism 
that moves towards being-in-the-world as one authentic being relating to 
another. Taken to its fullest extent, they confront a new authentic mode of 
existing that they will eventually have to acknowledge, and may ﬁ nd on return-
ing home they have created new attitudes, beliefs and values.
